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Individuals ought to be able to protect themselves from gun suicide by mak-
ing it more difficult for them to buy guns. This Article examines the constitution-
ality of two robust, voluntary restraints on gun purchase. A person who selected
the first option would be able to purchase a gun only after receiving judicial
approval. Under the second option, the ban on purchase would be irrevocable.
The Article concludes that neither option violates the Second Amendment, but
that a contrary holding is possible with respect to the irrevocable purchase ban.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ulysses did not escape the Sirens' deadly song on his own. He relied on
his crew to tie him to the mast and, crucially, instructed them if he begged
for release too soon to "bind me more tightly still."' Ulysses understood that
self-imposed restrictions may not be effective if too easily undone. This Ar-
ticle translates Ulysses's wisdom into the context of firearm suicide.
Suicide claimed 41,149 lives in the United States in 2013.2 It was the
tenth-leading cause of death overall and among the top five causes of death
for people between the ages of 10 and 54. Most suicide attempts are impul-
sive.4 Rather than successfully re-attempt suicide, the vast majority of sui-
cide attempt survivors go on to die of natural causes.' But those who attempt
suicide with a firearm almost never get a second chance. One study found
that between 80% and 90% of suicide attempts using firearms are fatal,'
making guns the most lethal common method.' As a result, half of com-
' HOMER, THE ODyssEy, BOOK XII (Samuel Butler trans.) (800 B.C.E.), http://classics.mit
.edu/Homer/odyssey.12.xii.htmi [https://perma.cc/K44D-USGE].
' NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROi & PRE-




4 See Linda G. Peterson et al., Self-Inflicted Gunshot Wounds: Lethality ofMethod Versus
Intent, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 228, 230 (1985) (finding that the time between a decision to
commit suicide with a firearm and an attempt was usually less than a day).
s David Owens, Judith Horrocks & Allan House, Fatal and Non-Fatal Repetition of Self-
Harm: Systematic Review, 181 BarI. J. PSYCHOt. 193, 193 (2002).
6 Matthew Miller et al., The Epidemiology of Case Fatality Rates for Suicide in the North-
east, 43(6) ANNALs EMERGENCY MED. 723, 723, 726 (2004) [hereinafter Epidemiology]; Re-
becca S. Spicer & Ted R. Miller, Suicide Acts in 8 States: Incidence and Case Fatality Rates by
Demographics and Method, 90 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 1885, 1887 (2000).
Spicer & Miller, supra note 6, at 1888 tbl.2.
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pleted suicides involve firearms.' Given these statistics, it should not be sur-
prising that studies show reducing access to firearms reduces suicide.9
Reducing access to firearms is, however, controversial. Debates over
gun control generally involve a trade-off between saving lives" and preserv-
ing the right to bear arms." The two sides are entrenched and common
ground is vanishingly slim. As long as the focus is on mandatory restrictions
of gun rights, the trench warfare seems likely to continue for decades to
come. But a new paradigm is possible-one that bridges the gap by simulta-
neously promoting safety and liberty. Allow people who fear suicide to vol-
untarily restrict their own gun purchase rights.
One of the authors has previously proposed allowing individuals to pre-
vent their own future gun purchases by confidentially submitting their names
to the federal background check system.12 Once in the system-the National
Instant Criminal Background Check, or "NICS"-participants would not be
able to purchase firearms from licensed dealers. Participants could have their
names removed by making a request and simply waiting seven days (Option
One). This proposal is termed "Precommitment Against Suicide," or
"PAS." PAS is designed to stop individuals from purchasing a firearm in an
impulsive suicide attempt.
A one-week delay, however, would not be enough to prevent all gun
suicide attempts. Joseph Braman waited the statutorily required fifteen days
for delivery of a new handgun in California:
Three days later, Braman was sitting in the bedroom of his
Oakland home with his wife, Michele, who is blind. The couple
were making out a grocery shopping list and Braman, who had just
taken a shower, got up and went into th6 bathroom.
8 Matthew Miller et al., Firearms and Suicide in the United States: Is Risk Independent of
Underlying Suicidal Behavior?, 178 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 946, 946 (2013) [hereinafter Fire-
arms and Suicide] (citing Injury Prevention & Control: Data & Statistics, NAT'L CTR. FOR
INJURY PREVENTrION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www
.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html [https://perma.cc/86XP-7MRR] (last updated Dec. 8,
2015)).
' Andrew Anglemyer, Tara Horvath & George Rutherford, The Accessibility of Firearms
and Risk for Suicide and Homicide Victimization among Household Members: A Systematic
Review and Meta-analysis, 160 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 101, 105 (2014).
1o The website of the advocacy group Everytown for Gun Safety in May 2015 featured
stories on child gun deaths, mass shootings, violence against women, and school shootings.
See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, http://everytown.org/ [https://perma.cc/FD96-M6TW].
" The NRA Institute for Legislative Action website states: "Established in 1975, the Insti-
tute for Legislative Action (ILA) is the 'lobbying' arm of the National Rifle Association of
America. ILA is responsible for preserving the right of all law-abiding individuals in the legis-
lative, political, and legal arenas, to purchase, possess and use firearms for legitimate purposes
as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." NRA-ILA, https://www
.nraila.org/gun-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/JRR4-7858]. See generally District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
12 Fredrick E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465, 1465 (2015).
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Michele Braman heard what she thought was a car backfire.
Then she heard what sounded like water splashing against the
shower curtain and wondered why Braman was bathing again.
"And then I thought I smelled gunpowder," she said. "Be-
cause I don't see, my other senses are so acutely developed that I
hear and smell and sense things to a great degree.
"I screamed for him and I ran into the bathroom."
Braman was slumped over the bathtub as blood from his head
sprayed against the shower curtain.'3
Joseph Braman is not alone: Notwithstanding the state's waiting period, a
person's risk of suicide in California in the first week after a gun purchase is
fifty-seven times the rate in the general population.4 Braman and his wife
knew he was at high risk of suicide. He had twice been involuntarily com-
mitted to mental hospitals and had even attempted suicide that winter.
The present Article would significantly improve PAS by adding a sec-
ond and third removal option to the sign-up form, in addition to the origi-
nally proposed seven-day delay option (Option One).'" Option Two would
require a judicial hearing where the burden would be on the individual seek-
ing removal from NICS to show that he or she is not at elevated risk of
suicide." Under Option Three, a person could not remove his or her name
from the list-in other words, a person could opt for a permanent lifetime
bar on gun purchases.
Providing Option Two will prevent more suicides than Option One
alone. Individuals with a relatively high lifetime risk of suicide may have
extended periods when they feel fine and do not fully appreciate their long-
term risk." A seven-day delay to restore gun-purchase rights may not be a
strong enough deterrent to protect such individuals from themselves. They
need a crew like that of Ulysses to bind them more tightly still."
Of course, Option Two will only work if people at relatively high risk
of suicide sign up for it. One review of seventy-six- studies found that the
" John Hurst, Error Limits Gun Buyer Checks: Firearms: Assemblyman Vows to Amend
Law Intended to Encourage People to seek Mental Help by not Forbidding Them to Buy Weap-
ons. A Widow Says the Measure Allowed Her Husband to Kill Himself, L.A. TIM1-s (May 21,
1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-21/news/mn-38185 1_mental-patient [https://per
ma.cc/6NA5-JU59].
1 Garen J. Wintemute et al., Mortality Among Recent Purchasers of Handguns, 341 NEW
ENGL. J. MED. 1583, 1583 (1999).
" Hurst, supra note 13.
16 The details, merits, and constitutionality of Option One are described at length else-
where, see generally Vars, supra note 12, and will not be repeated here.
" Alternatively, the individual could obtain removal by showing that the initial waiver
was invalid.
I Erkki lsometsi, Suicidal Behaviour in Mood Disorders-Who, When, and Why?, 59
CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 120, 126 (2014) (reporting relatively low risk of suicide during partial
remission for patients with major depressive disorder as compared with very high risk during
depressive episodes).
' HOMER, supra note 1.
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median percentage of suicides involving mental disorder was around 90%.20
Roughly half of suicide victims during their lifetimes had contact with a
mental health professional.21 If even a modest percentage of these individu-
als could be persuaded to sign up for PAS, millions at high risk would be
putting very significant distance between themselves and gun suicide.
Requiring an individual at the Option Two hearing to show no elevated
risk of suicide obviously tracks the goal of the proposal: suicide prevention.
It also echoes the current federal standard for relief from other firearm dis-
qualifications, like the prohibition on firearm purchases by convicted felons.
To have gun rights restored, such prohibited individuals must show that they
"will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the
granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest."2 2 The
danger to safety here is suicide and the public interest is preventing it. Eval-
uating the risk of suicide is exactly what the judge should be doing.
Option Three is the furthest extension of PAS. A permanent restriction
on gun purchase would have the greatest impact on suicide, if people would
be willing to sign up. And while the attractiveness of Option Three is unt-
ested, it seems plausible that at least some individuals at high risk of suicide
would want the peace of mind of putting guns permanently out of reach.
Thus, Options Two and Three would prevent suicide. This Article ex-
amines their constitutionality. These options arguably impose more substan-
tial burdens than Option One on the constitutional right to bear arms. Part II
argues that intermediate scrutiny is more appropriate, and more likely to
apply, than strict scrutiny. Because there is residual uncertainty as to the
applicable level of scrutiny, this Article examines each option under both
levels. Part III steps back to outline the scope and implications of potential
challenges under either test. Part IV applies strict scrutiny to both options. It
concludes that Option Two should pass, but that the outcome on Option
Three is uncertain. Of greatest practical import, Part V establishes that both
options would easily clear intermediate scrutiny, which is the standard that
should apply.
II. LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court recognized an individual right to keep and bear
arms under the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller23 and
held that the right applies against he states in McDonald v. City of Chi-
20 J.T.O. Cavanagh et al., Psychological Autopsy Studies of Suicide: A Systematic Review,
33 PSYCHOL. MED. 395, 399 (2003).
21 Jason B. Luoma, Catherine E. Martin & Jane L. Pearson, Contact with Mental Health
and Primary Care Providers before Suicide: A Review of the Evidence, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 909, 912 (2002).
22 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2012).
23 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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cago.2 4 However, the Court did not identify the level of scrutiny courts
should use to evaluate constitutional challenges based on the newly recog-
nized individual right.25 Thus, the Supreme Court left uncertainty about the
appropriate level of scrutiny in the lower federal and state courts.
In response, the Courts of Appeals have adopted a two-part test for
evaluating Second Amendment challenges.26 The courts first ask "whether
the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment."2
If the law does not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment,
there is no Second Amendment violation.28 If the challenged law does bur-
den such conduct, the courts then evaluate whether the law passes constitu-
tional scrutiny.29 The appropriate level of scrutiny depends on "the nature of
the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law bur-
dens the right." 30 There are three potential standards of constitutional means-
ends scrutiny: rationality review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny."
In Heller, the Court expressly rejected rationality review.3 2 Therefore, either
strict or intermediate scrutiny will apply to any Second Amendment chal-
lenge against PAS that passes the first judicial inquiry.
A. Options Two and Three May Not Burden Conduct Protected
by the Second Amendment
PAS imposes the same restriction on participants-the inability to
purchase a gun from a licensed dealer-under both Option Two and Option
Three. It is unclear whether this restriction burdens conduct protected by the
Second Amendment.
' McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
25 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 (finding instead that the D.C. firearm restrictions were
unconstitutional "[u]nder any of the standards of [constitutional] scrutiny").
26 See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky
v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012); Nat'1 Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives (NRA v. BATFE), 700 F.3d 185, 194-95
(5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia
(Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684,
701-04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
27 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136.
28 Some circuits have indicated that "even if a regulated activity presumably falls outside
the scope of the Second Amendment right, a regulation may still be subject to an as-applied
challenge." Greeno, 679 F.3d at 520-21.
29 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1136.
30 Id. (quoting Chester, 628 F.3d at 682). But see Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriffs Dep't,
775 F.3d 308, 331 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying strict scrutiny categorically to all Second Amend-
ment challenges), reh'g granted, No. 13-1876, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21,
2015), argued Oct. 14, 2015.
31 Tyler, 775 F.3d at 322.
32 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (stating that rational
basis review "could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a
specific, enumerated right," including "the right to keep and bear arms").
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To determine whether particular conduct is protected by the Second
Amendment, Heller instructs courts to analyze the historical understanding
of the amendment.33 Because of this historical framework, some "longstand-
ing prohibitions," including "prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill," are "presumptively lawful" and are not pro-
tected by the Second Amendment.3 4 The categories enumerated in Heller
indicate that historically unprotected conduct falls outside the scope of the
Second Amendment's current protection.
Because the Court included longstanding prohibitions on firearm pos-
session by the mentally ill in the category of presumptively lawful restric-
tions,35 if all PAS participants are mentally ill,3 6 PAS may not implicate
Second Amendment concerns. However, it is impossible to say that all PAS
participants will be mentally ill. Therefore, it is unlikely that this analogy
will conclusively end any Second Amendment challenge. Nevertheless, the
analogy suggests that Options Two and Three may not burden conduct pro-
tected by the Second Amendment.
A regulation may also fall outside the scope of the Second Amend-
ment's protection if the regulation is justified based on the same reasoning
used to justify historical regulations on unprotected groups.37 For example, in
United States v. Seay, the Eighth Circuit held that the federal prohibition on
firearm possession by substance abusers does not violate the Second
Amendment.38 The court noted that Congress, in passing the legislation, in-
tended to keep firearms from "a dangerous class of individuals."3 9 As a re-
sult, the prohibition "is the type of 'longstanding prohibition[] on the
possession of firearms' that Heller declared presumptively lawful."*
Following this reasoning, a second analogy emerges. Options Two and
Three may not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment because
PAS can be justified following the same reasoning that underlies longstand-
3 Id.; see also NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) ("[W]e look to whether
the law harmonizes with the historical traditions associated with the Second Amendment guar-
antee."); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[A] wider historical
lens is required if we are to follow the Court's lead in resolving questions about the scope of
the Second Amendment by consulting its original public meaning as both a starting point and
an important constraint on the analysis.").
34 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26.
35 Id.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 137-143.
37 See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (questioning whether
the federal prohibition on possession of firearms by substance abusers may be presumptively
lawful because "it presumably serves the same purpose as restrictions on possession by
felons").
38 United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010).
3 Id. (quoting United States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 280 (3d Cir. 2010)).
4 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). Judge Easterbrook ex-
pressed a similar understanding in the Seventh Circuit's en banc opinion in United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010). He explained that the original meaning of the
Second Amendment encompassed the idea that "some categorical limits" on firearms set by
the legislature are proper. Id.
2016] 677
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ing, presumptively lawful regulations. Just as prohibitions of firearm posses-
sion from felons and substance abusers exist to curb violence by targeting
particularly dangerous groups, PAS would seek to prevent suicide by target-
ing a high-risk population. In fact, research indicates that the group most
likely to sign up for PAS-those with a psychiatric diagnosis-are just as, if
not more, dangerous than past violent offenders.41 For example, one meta-
analysis found that, on average, 87.3% of individuals who commit suicide
have some form of psychiatric disorder.42 In comparison, a study of Swedish
crime data found that only 63% of violent offenders in the country were
repeat offenders (2-11 prior violent offenses).43 Given the consistently high
rates of suicide amongst potential participants, PAS is analogous to the
felon-in-possession ban upheld in Heller. As the Eighth Circuit reasoned in
Seay, this analogy may prevent PAS from burdening conduct protected by
the Second Amendment.
However, not all courts follow Seay's reasoning.44 Rather than explor-
ing the historical implications of gun regulations, several circuits simply rea-
son that if a law makes it more difficult for a person to lawfully acquire a
firearm, then the law easily burdens a right within the scope of the Second
Amendment.4 5 For example, one court of appeals held that a novel firearm
registration scheme burdened Second Amendment rights simply because it
made it more difficult for a person to acquire and keep a gun for self-defense
in the home.46 Following this reasoning, both Options Two and Three would
burden a right within the scope of the Second Amendment because each
would bar otherwise legal firearm purchases.
Given these divergent approaches, it is unclear whether PAS implicates
the Second Amendment at all. Options Two and Three may be analogous
enough to longstanding prohibitions on the mentally ill to be considered pre-
sumptively lawful. If PAS does not burden conduct protected by the Second
Amendment, any constitutional challenge would fail. On the other hand,
PAS arguably burdens the Second Amendment by restricting access to fire-
arms. Some Courts of Appeals might find this burden sufficient to trigger
constitutional scrutiny. If PAS burdens conduct protected by the Second
Amendment, it becomes necessary to determine whether Options Two and
Three will be evaluated under strict or intermediate scrutiny.
" See infra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. There is an important difference. The
primary risk posed by people with mental illness is self-harm, whereas violent offenders prey
on others.
42 Genevieve Arsenault-Lapierre et al., Psychiatric Diagnoses in 3275 Suicides: A Meta-
Analysis, 4 BMC PSYCHIATRY 37, 37 (2004).
4 Orjan Falk et al., The 1% of the Population Accountable for 63% of All Violent Crime
Convictions, 49 Soc. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIc EPIDEMIOLOGY 559, 564-65 (2014).
" One concurring circuit judge rejected the status-based analogy of felons to misdemean-
ants. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bea, J., concurring).
45 See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d
792, 801 (10th Cir. 2010).
46 Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1255.
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B. PAS Will Likely Be Evaluated Under Intermediate Scrutiny
The next relevant inquiry under the two-part framework is whether Op-
tions Two and Three would be evaluated under strict or intermediate scru-
tiny.47 To determine the appropriate level of scrutiny, courts generally ask
whether the regulation substantially burdens individual rights and how close
the regulation comes to burdening the core of the Second Amendment.48
What follows from the answers to these questions varies somewhat across
circuits, as explained below.
As to the first part of the question, courts employ various methods to
determine whether a law substantially burdens Second Amendment rights.
For example, the Second Circuit asks whether "adequate alternatives remain
for law-abiding citizens to acquire a firearm" to determine whether a law
imposes a substantial burden.4 9 In one case, the Second Circuit held that
§ 922(a)(3), which prohibits an unlicensed individual from transferring a
gun into his state of residence from out of state, does not substantially bur-
den Second Amendment rights.s0 The court reasoned that the law left open
ample alternatives for acquiring a firearm: purchasing in-state or purchasing
from out of state if the weapon is first transferred to a licensed dealer.' PAS
leaves open fewer alternative avenues for acquiring a gun to use for self-
defense than § 922(a)(3) leaves open, because participants are prohibited
from purchasing a gun from any federally licensed dealer, in-state or out-of-
state. Nevertheless, PAS leaves open some alternatives. For example, in most
states participants will be able to purchase firearms through intrastate private
sales.52 Additionally, there is no restriction on access to guns through friends
and family, because the proposal does not prohibit possession. These alterna-
tives may be enough to prevent PAS from imposing a substantial burden on
Second Amendment rights.
47 See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138.
48 Id. This approach has been adopted by the Second Circuit, Kachalsky v. County of
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012); the Fifth Circuit, NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185,
195 (5th Cir. 2012); the Seventh Circuit, Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir.
2011); the Ninth Circuit, Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1168 n. 15 (9th Cir.
2014); and the D.C. Circuit, Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257.
49 United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2012); see also New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 259 (2d Cir. 2015) ("The scope of the
legislative restriction and the availability of alternatives factor into our analysis . .
50 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168.
5' Id.
52 Intrastate private sales are generally exempt from the formal background check require-
ments. Michael P. O'Shea, The Steepness of the Slippery Slope: Second Amendment Litigation
in the Lower Federal Courts and What It Has To Do With Background Recordkeeping Legisla-
tion, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1381, 1391 (2014). Eight states-California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington State-and the District of Co-
lumbia require universal background checks for all gun sales. Universal Background Checks &
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Furthermore, several courts distinguish between laws that regulate and
laws that totally restrict Second Amendment rights when determining how
severe a burden a challenged law imposes.53 Courts have reasoned that some
form of review beyond intermediate scrutiny is required when a law imposes
a complete bar on exercising a certain right. 4 For example, one circuit evalu-
ated a city ordinance that required a handgun to be either carried on one's
person, stored in a locked container, or kept trigger-locked. The court noted
that the ordinance does not impose a substantial burden because it is a "man-
ner" restriction.-- The court reasoned that, even though a law makes it sig-
nificantly more difficult for a person to acquire and keep a gun, there is no
substantial burden when the law does not prevent firearm possession in the
home.16
Although at first glance PAS, particularly Option Three, appears to im-
pose a complete ban, the proposal is essentially a time, place, and manner
restriction. PAS prevents purchase from federally licensed dealers but does
not eviscerate participants' potential access to or possession of guns. There-
fore, the proposal does not completely ban firearm possession or use in the
home and likely does not impose a substantial burden on Second Amend-
ment rights. In the Second Circuit, a substantial burden is required for a
Second Amendment violation, so PAS would be upheld with no further in-
quiry. 7 Other Courts of Appeals move on to the second part of the ques-
tion-whether the law burdens the Second Amendment's core.
Under the second part, both Options Two and Three arguably burden
the core of the Second Amendment. This inquiry necessarily turns on what
the core of the Second Amendment is. After Heller and McDonald, there can
be no dispute that the core of the Amendment includes a right to self-defense
in the home.5 9 What is still disputed is whether the core extends to self-
" See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. New York City, 86
F. Supp. 3d 249, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
5 See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014);
Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708-09; cf. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010)
(applying intermediate scrutiny because a law was merely regulatory and did not totally con-
strain the exercise of Second Amendment rights).
5 Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, laws that only burden
the time, place, or manner of speech are subject to lower constitutional scrutiny than laws that
prohibit speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit recognizes that laws that merely regulate the manner of gun use rather than prevent gun
use do not severely burden the Second Amendment. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964. Under the
court's rationale, the city ordinance at issue, by requiring guns to be securely stored or dis-
abled, only regulates the manner of gun use. See id.
56 Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964-65.
" Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012).
58 See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 965; United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th
Cir. 2010).
" McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2010); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008); David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller's
Lesson for the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. Rev. 235, 237-38 (2008) (asserting that Heller recog-
nizes self-defense as a "natural right").
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defense outside the home.60 Either way, PAS will hinder participants' ability
to defend themselves against others using a gun, both inside and outside
their homes. Options Two and Three therefore likely implicate the core of
the Second Amendment by affecting participants' abilities to access guns for
self-defense.
One scholar has proposed a creative, functional approach to the Second
Amendment that suggests the opposite result. Accepting self-defense in the
home as the core function, Joseph Blocher argues that the Second Amend-
ment also encompasses a right to decide not to keep and bear arms.6' Under
this conception, a law like PAS allowing individuals to prevent themselves
from purchasing firearms would promote, rather than burden, the core of the
Second Amendment by facilitating self-defense against suicide. This theory
has some appeal, but to our knowledge, no court has yet adopted it.
Intermediate scrutiny is likely when a law burdens the core of the Sec-
ond Amendment, but does not substantially burden Second Amendment
rights.62 Therefore, PAS would likely be evaluated under intermediate scru-
tiny. This conclusion is consistent with the trend among courts post-Heller
and McDonald. The courts have overwhelmingly applied intermediate scru-
tiny to Second Amendment challenges.63 For example, out of the eighteen
cases that have evaluated the federal ban on firearm possession by domestic
violence misdemeanants post-Heller, ten have applied intermediate scru-
tiny,6 and only one has applied strict scrutiny."5
Courts have applied intermediate scrutiny even when a regulation sub-
stantially burdens the core of the Second Amendment. For example, one
court of appeals reviewed the federal ban on handgun sales to individuals
under the age of 21 and on general firearm sales to individuals under the age
of 18.66 The court was not willing to declare the rights of 18-to-20-year-olds
to be historically outside the scope of the Second Amendment.7 However,
' See generally Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012).
6 See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REv. 1, 6 (2012).
62 See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 965; Chester, 628 F.3d at 683. In dicta, the Fifth Circuit
has suggested that any infringement at the core of the Second Amendment, whether substantial
or not, triggers strict scrutiny. NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012).
61 See Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations after Heller and McDon-
ald, 70 Mo. L. REV. 1131, 1145 (2011); Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third
Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 703, 752 (2012).
' See United States v. Carter, 752 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Chester
(Chester II), 514 F. App'x 393, 394 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127,
1138 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Tooley, 468 F. App'x 357, 359 (4th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 160
(4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 (S.D. W.Va. 2010); United States v. Walker, 709
F. Supp. 2d 460, 466 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v. Pettengill, 682 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55 (D.
Me. 2010). This is a persuasive analogy because domestic violence misdemeanants, like PAS
participants, are a high-risk population not specifically mentioned in Heller.
65 See United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-32 (D. Utah 2009).
6NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d at 185.
67 Id. at 204.
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because the regulation was "an outgrowth of an American tradition of regu-
lating certain groups' access to arms for the sake of public safety,"16 the
court applied intermediate scrutiny.69 The regulation's resemblance to histori-
cal, presumptively valid bans on possession by felons and the mentally ill
led the court to apply less stringent scrutiny. Similarly, PAS may be analo-
gous enough to longstanding bans that are intended to protect public safety
to warrant intermediate scrutiny. 0
There was a break in this trend, however, in a recent Sixth Circuit
case." In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff's Department, a panel applied
strict scrutiny to strike down the federal ban on firearm possession by one
who has been previously committed to a mental institution.72 The opinion
points out that, while generally the Courts of Appeals have applied interme-
diate scrutiny, "the circuits' actual approaches are less neat-and far less
consistent-than that."" While Tyler was the first case out of the courts of
appeals to categorically adopt strict scrutiny, it is uncertain whether this re-
sult will survive. The concurring judge in the case would have applied inter-
mediate scrutiny.74 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit in April 2015 granted a
rehearing en banc, which had the immediate effect of vacating the panel's
opinion.
While intermediate scrutiny is more likely, the framework for constitu-
tional challenges under the Second Amendment is evolving, as illustrated by
Tyler. The circuit courts developed the two-part framework with uncertainty
because the Supreme Court provided little guidance on analyzing Second
Amendment challenges in Heller and McDonald.75 Thus, the choice of ap-
propriate constitutional scrutiny is not certain and is subject to change. Due
to this ambiguity, we evaluate Options Two and Three under both strict and
intermediate scrutiny.
61 Id. at 205.
69 Id. at 206.
0 The Fifth Circuit has asserted that "a longstanding measure which harmonizes with the
history and tradition of arms regulation in this country would not threaten the core of the
Second Amendment guarantee," and therefore warrants intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 196.
" Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 331 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g granted,
No. 13-1876, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015), argued Oct. 14, 2015.
72 Id.
7 Id. at 324.
74 See id. at 344 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
7 Some have suggested that Heller and McDonald do not contemplate judicial interest-
balancing at all. Rather, these commentators uggest that the cases dictate strict categorical
protections and exceptions based on history, text, and tradition. See Joseph Blocher, Categori-
calism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375,
405-11 (2009); E. Garret Barlow, Note, United States v. Reese and Post-Heller Second
Amendment Interpretation, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REv. 391, 400-02 (2012).
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III. THE SCOPE OF THE CHALLENGE
Before analyzing whether Options Two and Three pass strict and inter-
mediate scrutiny, this section evaluates the scope of the constitutional chal-
lenge that participants can bring against PAS. The proposal rests on the
theory of precommitment, which assumes that a participant may change his
mind about purchasing a firearm in the future.7 6 Some participants may chal-
lenge the law when they change their minds, rather than accept their precom-
mitments. This section parses out which participants are most likely to bring
a successful challenge, recognizing that most participants will execute a
valid waiver of their Second Amendment rights when signing up for PAS. A
constitutional challenge brought by a participant who has executed a valid
waiver will fail because the individual will have given up constitutional
protection.
To be effective, waivers of constitutional rights must be voluntary,
"knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant cir-
cumstances and likely consequences."77 A notarized form containing an ex-
press, written waiver "is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver,"
but is not conclusive.78
Most participants' waivers will be voluntary because they will not be
impacted by any improper government influence.79 The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that, for a confession to be an involuntary waiver and thus inadmis-
sible in court under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, there
must have been some coercive state action.s0 The defendant's "mental condi-
tion, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion," does not create
an involuntary waiver."1 Similarly, official coercion may be required for a
waiver of Second Amendment rights to be involuntary. Official coercion
will not often arise under PAS because participants will execute the waivers
themselves. Thus, there is little opportunity for coercive state action; the
state is not involved.8 2
76 See Vars, supra note 12, at 1467.
n Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
" North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
79 Vars, supra note 12, at 1495-96.
o Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). The Court also held official coercion
is required for an individual's waiver of his Miranda rights to be deemed involuntary under the
Fifth Amendment. See id. at 170-71.
11 Id. at 164. This reasoning is reinforced by Rule I I of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Under Rule I1, to ensure a plea is entered voluntarily, the judge must ensure the
plea "did not result from force, threats, or promises." FED. R. CRIM. P. II (b)(2). These consid-
erations speak to potential inappropriate official action.
82 The government may be involved when people in state facilities sign up for PAS. If
participants are coerced while in state custody, they will not have executed a valid waiver.
While this potential for abuse exists, it will be limited, and most participants will not experi-
ence coercive state action.
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Participants' waivers will likely also be knowing and intelligent because
the form will include "[c]lear waiver language."3 For example, the form
might read:
By signing this form, I hereby request that my name be added
to the federal background check system (NICS).
As long as my name is in the system, no one who is required
to run a federal background check before transferring a firearm
will be able to transfer a firearm to me.
I understand that by signing this form I may be waiving some
of my rights under the Second Amendment and I do so knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.
The Supreme Court has held that the standard for mental competency to
stand trial also requires that a criminal defendant's guilty plea and waiver of
the right to an attorney be intelligent." The test is "whether [the defendant]
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him."85 Presumably, this
test (adjusted to apply outside a criminal proceeding) would also apply to
determine whether a participant is competent to waive his Second Amend-
ment rights. Under this standard, a case in which the participant does not
understand the waiver based on the clear statement will be rare. Thus, the
form will ordinarily constitute a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver
of participants' Second Amendment rights.
Because most participants will have executed a valid waiver, a facial
challenge to PAS will likely fail. To succeed on a facial challenge, a plaintiff
must prove "that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would
be valid."8 6 This standard will be impossible to meet. PAS is validly applied
when participants have waived their Second Amendment rights. Therefore,
there will always be a set of circumstances under which PAS is valid.
As a result, participants will only be able to bring as-applied challenges.
As-applied challenges are the standard way to question a law's constitution-
ality.87 For example, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court considered a facial
" Vars,supra note 12, at 1496. To ensure confessions are "knowing and intelligent," Rule
II requires judges, before entering a plea, to determine that the criminal defendant understands
his rights and the potential consequences of waiving the rights. FED. R. CRuM. P. I l(b)(1).
Similarly, one commentator has suggested adding a clear statement to Washington's advance
psychiatric directive form to meet the "knowing" and "intelligent" requirements. Nick Ander-
son, Note, Dr. Jekyll's Waiver of Mr. Hyde's Right o Refuse Medical Treatment, 78 WASH. L.
REv. 795, 815, 825-27 (2003). The statement would make clear that the signing individual
may be waiving her fundamental right to refuse medical treatment. Id. at 827.
8 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993).
* Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
86 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
1 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2000) ("As-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of
constitutional adjudication.").
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challenge to federal legislation banning partial-birth abortions."8 The statute
did not contain an exception for maternal health."9 Nevertheless, the Court
upheld the law and asserted that the proper way for women to challenge the
act's constitutionality based on the need for a maternal health exception was
through as-applied challenges.0 Similarly, the proper way for participants
who have not executed a valid waiver to question PAS's constitutionality is
through as-applied challenges.
It is possible that an as-applied challenge could effectively invalidate
PAS. Under the typical as-applied challenge, an individual argues that a law
cannot be constitutionally applied to her particular circumstances. However,
as-applied challenges do not always result in holdings that are specific to the
parties before the court.9' Rather, as-applied challenges can produce hold-
ings and reasoning that effectively invalidate an entire piece of legislation.92
For example, a criminal defendant may argue that he cannot be constitution-
ally sentenced to death, although his crime warrants execution, because he is
less than eighteen years old.93 Although the defendant's argument rests on his
particular circumstances, the court's holding will apply more broadly. In-
stead of holding that "the defendant cannot be executed," the court will hold
that "individuals under eighteen cannot be executed." Therefore, the holding
will invalidate the law as it applies to a large group of people, not just the
particular criminal defendant.9 4
In particular, means-ends crutiny-of which intermediate and strict
scrutiny are two versions-can lead to broad findings of invalidity through
as-applied challenges.95 Instead of requiring a court to determine how a chal-
lenged law fits a particular challenger, means-ends analysis requires a court
to ask how the law fits the public more generally.96 For example, in United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., the Court stated that analyzing whether a
law directly advances the government's interest "cannot be answered by lim-
iting the inquiry to whether the governmental interest is directly advanced as
applied to a single person or entity."97 To defend a challenged regulation, the
government is not required to prove that the particular plaintiff "trenched on
" See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
89 Id. at 161.
' See id. at 167-68.
11 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CA-IF. L. REv.
915, 924-25 (2011); see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010) (discussing an as-applied
challenge that is not confined to the plaintiffs' particular circumstances).
92 See Fallon, supra note 87, at 1337.
1 Roper v. Simmons held that executing juvenile criminal defendants violates the Eighth
and Fourth Amendments. See 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
9 See Fallon, supra note 91, at 924-25 (advancing this argument).
" See Fallon, supra note 87, at 1338.
96 See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430-31 (1993); Fallon, supra note
91, at 944. Fallon also asserts similar reasoning concerning intermediate scrutiny. See Fallon,
supra note 91, at 944.
9' Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 427.
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the interests that the regulation sought to protect."8 Rather, it is enough for
the government to show that the law, as it is generally applied, supports its
interest.99
Along the same lines, a statute can constitutionally apply to a particular
plaintiff yet still fail means-ends scrutiny based on broader structural flaws.
For example, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board, a publishing company challenged New York's "Son of
Sam" law, which requires the profits from any book in which a convicted
criminal discusses his crimes to be distributed to the crime's victims."oo
Under the law, the publishing company was required to transfer all profits
from an organized crime figure's biography to the state Crime Victims
Board.'0' Instead of questioning the challenged law in light of these particu-
lar facts, the Court invalidated the entire scheme.102 Even if the law constitu-
tionally applied to the publishing company, the statute, considering all
possible applications, was overbroad.103 Thus, an as-applied challenge invali-
dated the whole statute.
Similarly, even if the plaintiff in an as-applied challenge to PAS
presents a high risk of suicide such that the government's interest in suicide
prevention is promoted by the proposal's application to the particular partici-
pant, a court's analysis of the proposal's general applicability could reveal
that either Option Two or Three sweeps too broadly to pass strict or interme-
diate scrutiny. With this scope of the constitutional challenge to PAS in
mind, the remainder of the Article analyzes Options Two and Three under
strict and intermediate scrutiny.
IV. STRICT SCRUTINY
This section analyzes Options Two and Three under strict scrutiny. It is
helpful to first apply strict scrutiny because it is the more stringent constitu-
tional standard. Thus, if either option passes strict scrutiny, it is certain to
pass intermediate scrutiny. Furthermore, based on the uncertainties in Sec-
ond Amendment jurisprudence, a court may choose to apply strict scrutiny
to a constitutional challenge against PAS.
To survive strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest.'0 Suicide prevention is part of the compel-
ling government interest in public safety, which the government frequently
98 Id. at 431.
99 Id.
'"See generally Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105 (1991).
'o Id. at 108.
'02 See id. at 121, 123.
t03 Id.
" Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005).
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asserts to justify gun control laws. 0 Preventing suicide has itself been held
to constitute a compelling government interest."'" So both options are easily
justified by a compelling interest.107 Whether each option is narrowly tai-
lored to prevent suicide is a closer question.
A. The Narrow Tailoring Framework
Having established that Options Two and Three could be challenged as
unconstitutional, this section defines the narrow tailoring framework to ana-
lyze PAS. The definition of strict scrutiny is constant for any constitutional
question, but what narrow tailoring actually requires can change based on
the nature of the challenge.0 Thus, narrow tailoring analysis in Second
Amendment challenges may be unique from narrow tailoring analysis in
challenges asserting other constitutional rights.
There is limited post-Heller and McDonald case law applying strict
scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges. The Sixth Circuit's Tyler case,
discussed above, provides the most comprehensive narrow tailoring analysis.
Aside from Tyler, the closest example of strict scrutiny analysis in a federal
court of appeals is the Tenth Circuit's review of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)10m in
United States v. Reese."10 In Reese, the Tenth Circuit applied intermediate
scrutiny but stated in dicta that the government, based on the evidence it
presented to justify the challenged law under intermediate scrutiny, would
also satisfy strict scrutiny."' Otherwise, only three cases have applied strict
scrutiny in Second Amendment challenges.112 Furthermore, four cases have
applied strict scrutiny in the alternative,"3 reasoning that a law is constitu-
"05 See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 331 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g
granted, No. 13-1876, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015), argued Oct. 14,
2015; see also Grand Jury Subpoena, John Doe v. United States, 150 F.3d 170, 172 (2d Cir.
1998) (per curiam).
16 Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to Bear
Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 23 (2013).
"0' It could also be argued that PAS advances the compelling government interest in pro-
moting autonomous decision-making. Cf Blocher, supra note 61, at 18, 26-27 (arguing that
the Second Amendment creates a "choice right" that includes decision not to keep and bear
arms).
10 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267
(2007) (discussing the Supreme Court's range of approaches to strict scrutiny).
'"0 This code section contains the federal prohibition on firearm possession by individuals
who are subject to a domestic protection order.
United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 794 (10th Cir. 2010).
'Id. at 804.
112 See Bateman v. Perdue, 881 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (finding that North
Carolina's emergency declaration statutes' limitations on firearm possession were not narrowly
tailored to promote public safety); United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1232-35
(D. Utah 2009) (finding that the federal prohibition on firearm possession by domestic vio-
lence misdemeanants was narrowly tailored to promote safety); People v. Taylor, 3 N.E.3d
288, 295-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (finding that Illinois's requirement that people have identifica-
tion cards when they carry concealed weapons survived strict scrutiny).
" 3 Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1123-25 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
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tional "even if strict scrutiny applies,"I'4 or reasoning that a law is unconsti-
tutional "under either strict or intermediate scrutiny."1 5
While limited in scope, the case law reveals two general rules about
what Second Amendment narrow tailoring entails. First, the government
must prove that the challenged regulation actually promotes the asserted
compelling government interest.116 Second, to overcome strict scrutiny based
on an interest in public safety,' '1 the government must show that a regulation
is specifically formulated to prevent firearm access from individuals who
pose a risk of danger to themselves or others.' " Furthermore, Tyler recog-
nizes that a narrowly tailored law cannot be overbroad or underinclusive."l9
Scientific conclusiveness, however, is not necessary to establish narrow
tailoring. The Sixth Circuit notes in Tyler that "[the government can carry
its burden even under strict scrutiny (or at least a lenient version of it) 'based
solely on history, consensus, and simple common sense."' 120 Furthermore,
one commentator has suggested that Heller dictates a deferential form of
strict scrutiny.121 Under this deferential strict scrutiny, "a reviewing court
would make a subjective determination as to the necessity of the challenged
regulation to further public safety" and would refer to empirical evidence
only when the court "is skeptical of the law's necessity to public safety." 22
Similarly, in the First Amendment context,123 logical assertions that a
challenged regulation will actually promote the government's compelling in-
terest need not be scientifically conclusive.124 Rather, "a sufficiently persua-
sive common-sense foundation is enough" to establish this connection.125
For example, in Burson v. Freeman, the Supreme Court reviewed Tennes-
114 United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024-25 (E.D. Wis. 2008); State v.
Curtiss, No. 102,604, 2010 WL 4977222, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2010).
"' Fotoudis v. City & County of Honolulu, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1137, 1144 (D. Haw.
2014).
116 See infra Part IV.B.i.
"' Suicide prevention is part of the government's compelling interest in public safety. See
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
"" See infra Part IV.B.ii.
" Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 331 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g granted,
No. 13-1876, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015), argued Oct. 14, 2015.
This articulation of the narrow tailoring standard is consistent with generalizations taken from
strict scrutiny surveys. See Fallon, supra note 108, at 1326-30; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. Rrv. 2417,
2422-24 (1996).
20 Tyler, 775 F.3d at 331 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).
121 See Andrew R. Gould, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within D.C. v.
Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1571 (2009).
122 Id.
123 First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis presents a good comparison because courts
have already used First Amendment rules by analogy in formulating post-Heller and McDon-
aid Second Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702-09
(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010).
124 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion).
125 Volokh, supra note 119, at 2422; see also Burson, 504 U.S. at 211-12.
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see's restriction on campaign speech within 100 feet of a polling site.12 6 The
Court reasoned that it was "simple common sense" that the restricted zone
was necessary to protect voters' right to cast their ballots "free from the taint
of intimidation and fraud." 27 The Court further reasoned that it has never
held the state "to the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective ef-
fects" of the challenged restriction.'28
Following this framework, the next two subsections analyze Options
Two and Three. While both options present potential overbreadth and under-
inclusiveness pitfalls, Option Two would ultimately survive strict scrutiny,
while Option Three might fail.
B. Option Two Is Narrowly Tailored
1. Option Two Will Prevent Suicide
To be narrowly tailored, Option Two must actually prevent suicide, the
asserted government interest. Option Two aims to prevent suicide by al-
lowing at-risk individuals to voluntarily place their names in NICS and giv-
ing participants the ability to regain their rights through a judicial hearing.
The government can likely prove, to the extent necessary to overcome strict
scrutiny, that this approach will prevent suicide.
The case law analyzing two federal statutes-18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8)
and 922(g)(9)-demonstrates the ways in which the government can prove
that a gun control regulation actually promotes its interest. Two of the five
Second Amendment strict scrutiny cases evaluate either § 922(g)(8), the fed-
eral prohibition on firearm possession by individuals under a domestic pro-
tective order, or § 922(g)(9), the federal prohibition on firearm possession
by domestic violence misdemeanants.129 Additionally, a large number of
Second Amendment intermediate scrutiny cases involve these provisions.30
In these cases, the government has proven that §§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9)
actually promote the government's compelling interest in public safety by
showing three things'3': first, domestic abusers use guns; second, domestic
assaults with firearms are more deadly than domestic assaults with other
weapons; and third, there are high recidivism rates among domestic violence
126 Burson, 504 U.S. at 193.
1
2 7 Id. at 211.
128 Id. at 208.
129 See generally United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009).
' See generally United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); Reese, 627 F.3d at 792.
"I Though this line of reasoning has only been expressly applied in intermediate scrutiny
cases, the Tenth Circuit has stated that the same evidence would satisfy strict scrutiny narrow
tailoring analysis. See Reese, 627 F.3d at 804 n.4.
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offenders.'32 Following an analogous line of reasoning, the government can
prove that Option Two will actually prevent suicide.
a. People Use Guns to Commit Suicide
First, just as the government has shown in the domestic violence cases
that domestic abusers use guns, the government can show that people use
guns to commit suicide. Around 5-6% of self-imposed injuries are inflicted
using firearms.' While 5-6% seems like a small percentage, individuals use
guns in over 50% of completed suicides in the United States.3 4 Thus, fire-
arms may not account for a large amount of self-harm incidents, but firearms
account for the majority of suicides in the United States.
b. Suicide Attempts Using Guns Are More Deadly than Other
Attempts
Second, as the government has shown in the domestic violence cases
that domestic assaults with firearms are more deadly than assaults with other
weapons, the government can show that suicide attempts using guns are
more deadly than attempts using other methods. Between 80% and 90% of
suicide attempts using firearms are fatal.' Suicide attempts using drugs and
cutting-the second and third most common methods of suicide-are fatal
1-3% of the time.'36 The extreme mortality associated with suicide attempts
using firearms likely compensates, in terms of preventing suicide, for the
fact that only 5-6% of self-inflicted injuries are inflicted by firearms. For
example, denying access to a gun from just one out of every ten of the
roughly 22,000 individuals who attempted suicide by firearm in the United
States in 2010 would have resulted in approximately 1,900 fewer deaths for
the year. 3
c. Participants Pose a Danger to Themselves
Finally, in the domestic violence cases, the government has relied on
the high recidivism rates among offenders to prove that a past domestic vio-
lence offense is indicative of future violence. Similarly, the government can
show that a self-identified high risk of suicide is accurate, which in turn will
prove that PAS participants pose a risk of future self-harm.
13 See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1140; Reese, 627 F.3d at 802-04; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 643-45.
133 Epidemiology, supra note 6, at 726 tbl.; Spicer & Miller, supra note 6, at 1887 tbl.1.
114 Spicer & Miller, supra note 6, at 1887 tbl.l.
" Epidemiology, supra note 6, at 726 tbl.; Spicer & Miller, supra note 6, at 1888 tbl.2.
These data are consistent across the two multi-state studies. Together, the studies covered four-
teen states: California, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland; Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
3 Epidemiology, supra note 6, at 726 tbl.; Spicer & Miller, supra note 6, at 1888 tbl.2.
" Firearms and Suicide, supra note 8, at 951. This figure assumes substitution of drugs
or cutting to attempt suicide.
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While it is logical to conclude that individuals who restrict their own
access to firearms based on self-assessed suicide risk actually have a high
risk of suicide, it is not scientifically proven that self-assessment accurately
predicts suicide risk. However, while limited, there are data to support the
position. The Joiner study compares physician assessment to self-assessment
of suicide risk.'38 Only one individual, representing 0.3% of the study, as-
sessed himself as high-risk when the clinicians assessed him as low-risk.'3 9
The remaining 126 individuals who assessed themselves as high-risk were
also assessed by clinicians as high-risk.140 These results indicate that individ-
uals are not likely to erroneously find themselves to be at high risk of sui-
cide, at least compared to physician diagnosis. Furthermore, participants in
the study who self-assessed as low-risk but were assessed by clinicians as
high-risk had decreased suicidal symptoms at a six-month check in com-
pared to patients who had both an original self-assessment and clinician as-
sessment of high risk.141 This indicates that the individuals were more
accurate than clinicians in assessing their own low risk of suicide.142 This
further supports the accuracy of individuals' self-diagnoses.
There are good reasons to think that participants will pose a future risk
of self-harm. Mentally ill individuals are over ten times more likely to com-
mit suicide than individuals without mental illness.143 One study estimated
the lifetime suicide risk among patients with mood disorders to be between
6% and 7%, as compared with the general population's age-adjusted annual
death rate of 12.6 per 100,000.144 PAS will almost certainly be most popular
among populations like this with greatly increased risk of suicide.
The conclusion that participants will pose a danger to themselves, to-
gether with the established facts that people use guns to commit suicide and
suicide attempts using guns are more deadly than attempts using other meth-
ods, is likely sufficient to prove that Option Two will actually prevent sui-
38 See generally Thomas E. Joiner et al., Agreement Between Self- and Clinician-Rated
Suicidal Symptoms in a Clinical Sample of Young Adults: Explaining Discrepancies, 67 J.
CONsuIjrlNG & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 171 (1999). Patients evaluated themselves using the Sui-
cide Probability Scale. Id. at 172. Physicians evaluated the patients using the Modified Scale
for Suicide Ideation. Id. Both scales have established reliability. Id.
39 Id. The self-assessment in this study was based on a clinically developed questionnaire.
Self-assessment in PAS will be based on individuals' independent judgment, without the use of
a systematic rating scale. Thus, the self-assessment in PAS may be less reliable than the self-
assessment in the study.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 173.
142 Because PAS is voluntary, it is tailored to exclude individuals who recognize their own
low risk of suicide. The fact that self-assessment of low risk is more accurate than clinician
assessment makes the proposal less overinclusive than a program based on clinician assess-
ment of suicide risk would be. This feature of the proposal is relevant to narrow tailoring,
because a regulation can be unconstitutional under strict scrutiny if it is too overinclusive.
143 Vats & Young, supra note 106, at 21.
'"lsometsa supra note 18, at 120; JIAQUAN Xu FT AL., NAT'L Cmt. FOR HEALTH STATIS-
TICS, CTRS. FOR DisnAsE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEATHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2013, at 35 tbl.9
(Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G4UP-MPFS].
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cide. Therefore, Option Two satisfies the first general requirement under the
narrow tailoring framework.
2. Option Two Is Specifically Formulated to Prevent Possession by
Individuals who Pose a Risk of Danger to Themselves
Under the narrow tailoring framework, Option Two must also target
dangerous individuals. For example, courts have found that 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(8) and 922(g)(9) are narrowly tailored because the provisions re-
quire past violent or threatening behavior before individuals lose their Sec-
ond Amendment rights.1 45 Section 922(g)(8), which prohibits individuals
under domestic protective orders from possessing firearms, has been upheld
by the Northern District of New York.' 46 The court relied on the fact that the
domestic protective order must have been predicated on past dangerous con-
duct and must have been accompanied by a finding of threat to physical
safety or an express prohibition on the individual's use of force.147 Similarly,
§ 922(g)(9), which prohibits domestic violence misdemeanants from pos-
sessing firearms, has also been upheld based on the misdemeanants' procliv-
ity towards violence. In upholding the statute, the District of Utah reasoned
that although the regulation does not expressly require a "prospective risk of
violence," it effectively does because an element of the underlying misde-
meanor is "use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a
deadly weapon." 48
Following similar reasoning, a federal district court struck down North
Carolina's emergency declaration statute.149 The statute prohibited possession
of dangerous weapons off of one's own property during a state of emer-
gency.s0 The court reasoned that the statute was not narrowly tailored be-
cause the ban was not limited to particular "dangerous individuals or
dangerous conduct."'"' Similarly, in Tyler, the Sixth Circuit struck down the
145 See United States v. Erwin, No. 07-CR-556, 2008 WL 4534058, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct.
6, 2008); United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1235 (D. Utah 2009) ("Congress
and the Tenth Circuit have sufficiently narrowed the scope of § 922(g)(9)'s deprivation of
Second Amendment rights, so that it may be presumed that those included within the scope of
§ 922(g)(9) pose a prospective risk of violence to an intimate partner or child.").
146 See Erwin, 2008 WL 4534058, at *2.
147 See id.
148 Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-35.
14 Bateman v. Perdue, 881 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (E.D.N.C. 2012).
o5 0 Id. at 711.
151 Id. at 716. This requirement that targeted individuals specifically pose a risk of danger
is consistent with gun regulations in other areas of the law. For example, under certain circum-
stances, Indiana law allows law enforcement to seize guns from individuals deemed "danger-
ous." INo. CODE § 35-47-14-1 (2015). Under the statute, an individual is dangerous if he
"presents an imminent risk of personal injury to [himself] or to another individual" or if he
"may present a risk of personal injury to [himself] or to another individual in the future." Id.
An Indiana state court of appeals upheld this statutory structure against a claim that it violates
Indiana's constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense. Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823,
835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
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federal ban on firearm possession by individuals who have been committed
to a mental institution.152 Contrasting the provision to other, federal constitu-
tional provisions, the court noted that the law targets "a class that is poten-
tially non-violent and law-abiding." 53
Participation in PAS is not predicated on any past dangerous conduct.
However, the purpose of requiring previous dangerous conduct is ordinarily
to establish that there is some future risk of danger.15 4 In PAS, self-assess-
ment takes the place of past violent behavior to establish a high likelihood of
future suicide risk. Therefore, Option Two will reach individuals who pose a
risk of self-harm. Nevertheless, narrow tailoring requires more; it is still pos-
sible that Option Two is overbroad by affecting individuals who do not have
a high suicide risk, or underinclusive by not reaching far enough. The next
two subsections examine these possibilities.
a. Option Two Is Not Overinclusive Based on Uncertainty Over
Whether Participants Present a High Suicide Risk
As discussed above,'5 only participants who do not execute a valid
waiver can successfully challenge Option Two. Among that group, Option
Two will have a constitutional effect on participants who pose a high risk of
suicide because those participants further the government's compelling inter-
est in suicide prevention. However, Option Two may still overreach to affect
participants who have not executed a valid waiver and do not present a high
suicide risk.
While the Supreme Court has stated that a law cannot "burn the house
to roast the pig,"' 56 strict scrutiny does not require that every instance of
restricted conduct "have a provable, identifiable harmful effect."' 7 Rather, a
legislature "may cast a wider net than is necessary to perfectly remove the
harm" of firearms in the hands of the mentally ill.iss But the net cannot be
cast too wide.15 9
Typically, a law fails strict scrutiny based on overinclusiveness when
the law is not intentionally limited in scope to cover the problem being ad-
' 5 2 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 331 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g granted,
No. 13-1876, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015), argued Oct. 14, 2015.
153 Id. at 342; see also Binderup v. Holder, No. 13-cv-06750, 2014 WL 4764424, at
*21-31 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014) (reasoning that the federal felon-in-possession ban was un-
constitutional as applied to the plaintiff because he demonstrated no proclivity for violence).
1' See United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1235 (D. Utah 2009); see also
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010) ("The belief underpinning
§ 922(g)(9) is that people who have been convicted of violence once . . . are likely to use
violence again.").
155 See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
' Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989) (quoting Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
11 Volokh, supra note 119, at 2430.
'" Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff s Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 332 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g granted,
No. 13-1876, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015), argued Oct. 14, 2015.
15 Id.
2016] 693
Harvard Journal on Legislation
dressed as narrowly as possible.'6 For example, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the
Supreme Court evaluated Tennessee's requirement that residents live in the
state for one year before registering to vote.'6' The Court overturned the
durational residency requirement.62 It reasoned that the requirement was
overbroad in promoting the government's interest in ensuring voters were
knowledgeable about local political issues, because the restriction excluded
not only new residents who were not informed, but also new residents who
were fully informed.63
In contrast, Option Two prevents overreaching by allowing participants
to regain their Second Amendment rights through a judicial hearing. Option
Two gives the participants who do not actually pose a future risk of self-
harm a way out of the program. Furthermore, by requiring participants to
show that they no longer pose a heightened risk of self-harm to get their
rights back, Option Two remains tailored towards the goal of suicide preven-
tion. Option Two will neither keep participants who do not pose a suicide
risk in the program nor allow participants out of the program if they still
pose a risk.
Courts have held that similar rights-restoration regimes are indicative of
narrow tailoring. For example, Indiana allows officers to seize firearms from
dangerous individuals.'" After officers take a firearm, the court must affirm
that the firearm should be retained.'16 One hundred and eighty days after the
initial hearing, the individual may petition the court to return his weapon,
and the state must return the weapon if the individual proves through a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is no longer dangerous.166 The Indiana
Court of Appeals evaluated this scheme's conformity with Indiana's constitu-
tional right to bear arms in Redington v. State.'16 While concluding that the
scheme does not impose a substantial obstacle on the right to bear arms, the
court noted "that the Act provides a mechanism whereby [affected individu-
'"See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 357-60 (1972).
16' Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 330.
1
62 Id. at 360.
163 Id.; see also Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (hold-
ing that the section of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act prohibiting political com-
mittees from spending over $1000 on a candidate's campaign was overbroad and not narrowly
tailored to combat against election fraud because it applied to small organizations that posed
no threat of corruption).
" INo. CODE §§ 35-47-14-1 to -10 (2015). Under the statute, an individual is "danger-
ous" if: "(1) the individual presents an imminent risk of personal injury to the individual or to
another individual; or (2) the individual may present a risk of personal injury to the individual
or to another individual in the future and the individual: (A) has a mental illness . . . that may
be controlled by medication, and has not demonstrated a pattern of voluntarily and consistently
taking the individual's medication while not under supervision; or (B) is the subject of docu-
mented evidence that would give rise to a reasonable belief that the individual has a propensity
for violent or emotionally unstable conduct." IND. COM § 35-41-14-1 (2015).
165 IND. CODE § 35-47-14-6 (2015).
" IND. CODE § 35-47-14-8 (2015).
67 See generally Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
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als] may regain both [their] right to carry a handgun as well as recover
[their] seized firearms."'16 Following similar reasoning, Option Two is not
impermissibly overinclusive because it provides a rights-restoration process
for participants who are not at elevated suicide risk.
b. Option Two's Voluntariness Does Not Make It Unconstitutionally
Underinclusive
Although Option Two is not unconstitutionally overinclusive, it also
presents a risk of unconstitutional underinclusiveness. Unlike the firearm
regulations that have passed constitutional muster, PAS is not mandatory.
Because PAS is voluntary, targeted individuals are not forced to comply.
Thus, there is no certainty that targeted, high-risk individuals will partici-
pate. This uncertainty makes PAS potentially underinclusive, should it fail to
impact a significant number of high-risk individuals.
An attack based on underinclusiveness will likely fail. Underinclusive-
ness is relevant in narrow tailoring analysis because it often reveals that a
challenged law seeks to promote an impermissible interest, rather than the
asserted compelling government interest.'69 For example, courts are con-
cerned about underinclusiveness in challenges to content-based speech re-
strictions because of the possibility that the restrictions impermissibly attack
specific content. 0 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hi-
aleah, a Florida city made animal sacrifice and slaughter illegal.'7 ' The city's
asserted interests were preventing animal cruelty and public health.172 The
Court found that the ordinances were underinclusive.73 The Court noted that
the city council had repeatedly stated that the ordinances' actual purpose was
to attack Santerian religious practices.174
Similarly, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, corporations
challenged a state law that prohibited them from spending to support refer-
endums that did not materially affect their business assets."' The Court
found that the statute was underinclusive in promoting the government's as-
serted interest in protecting corporate shareholder rights."' The statute pro-
hibited spending on referendums while still allowing corporations to lobby
68 Id. at 834.
169 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 757 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Underin-
elusiveness in a regulation may reveal that motives entirely inconsistent with the stated interest
actually lie behind its enactment."); Fallon, supra note 108, at 1327 ("Underinclusive regula-
tions . . . generate suspicion that the selective targeting betrays an impermissible motive.").
') See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011) (holding that a
California statute prohibiting children from buying violent video games was underinclusive
because it did not prohibit other forms of violent media, indicating that the legislature was
more concerned about video games themselves than about curbing violence among children).
171 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
172 See id. at 538.
173 See id. at 547.
174 See id. at 526.
'7 See generally First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
'76 Id. at 793.
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for legislation."' The statute's underinclusiveness indicated that the legisla-
ture was concerned with "silencing corporations on a particular subject,"
instead of shareholder protection.78
The case law indicates that underinclusiveness is not determinative
when there is no suggestion that the challenged law seeks to promote an
impermissible government motive.' 9 Courts have upheld underinclusive
laws under strict scrutiny. For example, the Supreme Court has not "sug-
gested that a state cannot forbid parents to withhold medical care from their
children, thereby trenching on parents' constitutional rights to control their
children's upbringing, unless it also regulates all other conduct that threatens
children's health."8 0 Furthermore, many courts have upheld the federal ban
on firearm possession by domestic violence misdemeanants without finding
the regulation to be underinclusive because it does not ban firearm posses-
sion from all violent misdemeanants.'s
With PAS, there is no impermissible motivation for regulating guns to
reduce suicide, but not taking all possible measures to eliminate suicide.
Rather, allowing voluntarily restricted access to guns is just a particularly
effective mechanism to promote the government's interest in suicide preven-
tion. Based on this lack of hidden motive and data indicating a high level of
participation among high-risk individuals, Option Two is not unconstitution-
ally underinclusive. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that any un-
derinclusiveness here exists precisely to avoid infringing on the Second
Amendment rights of those who choose not to participate.
This section's narrow tailoring analysis of Option Two reveals that it
would very likely survive strict scrutiny. First, the government will be able
to establish that Option Two actually prevents suicide. Second, the govern-
ment can show that Option Two is specifically tailored to target dangerous
individuals; Option Two is neither over- nor underinclusive. The next section
will apply the same narrow tailoring analysis to Option Three.
C. Option Three May Not Be Narrowly Tailored
Much of the Option Two strict scrutiny analysis applies equally to Op-
tion Three. Just as Option Two will actually prevent suicide, Option Three
will prevent suicide. In fact, Option Three has the potential to save more
..7 See id.
17 Id.
"' See Sanjour v. EPA, 984 F.2d 434, 449 (D.C. Cir.) ("Where the underinclusiveness
does not clearly imply a censorial motive, we must reject the underinclusiveness claim as long
as the statute or regulation actually furthers the proffered speech-neutral governmental inter-
est."), vacated, 997 F.2d 1584 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Fallon, supra note 108, at 1327 ("It is far
from clear . . . that every underinclusive statute is therefore necessarily unconstitutional.").
'n Fallon, supra note 108, at 1327 (citations omitted). Similarly, statutes that regulate
abortions based on maternal health are not held unconstitutional just because they do not ad-
dress "other threats to maternal health such as those posed by smoking or drinking." Id.
'"' See supra notes 129-132.
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lives than Option Two because it creates an irrevocable ban. Also, the same
doubts about whether Option Two targets individuals who pose a risk of self-
harm are relevant to Option Three. However, the Joiner study discussed
abovel8 2 likely provides enough evidence that self-assessment of a high risk
of suicide is accurate. That finding and common sense, at least under Tyler's
relatively lenient version of strict scrutiny, adequately demonstrate that the
vast majority of Option Three participants will pose a suicide risk.
Still, Option Three presents more potential constitutional pitfalls than
does Option Two, because Option Three imposes an irrevocable ban. There
is some indication in the Second Amendment jurisprudence that a restric-
tion's revocability contributes to the restriction's narrow tailoring. Thus, an
irrevocable restriction could be too broad to overcome strict scrutiny. For
example, in United States v. Skoien, the plaintiff argued that 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(9), which prevents firearm possession by domestic violence misde-
meanants, was unconstitutional because it overreaches "by creating a 'per-
petual' disqualification" for people who may not pose a future risk of
violence.'83 The Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that the plaintiff was a
recidivist who posed a future risk of violence, so he could not challenge
§ 922(g)(9) based on overbreadth.'^ However, the court took the time to
analyze the plaintiffs argument,8 5 indicating that, if the statute were irrevo-
cable, it may be unconstitutional.186 Similarly, a court upheld 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8), which prevents individuals under a domestic protective order
from possessing firearms, under strict scrutiny.' The court noted that the
statute does not impose an irrevocable ban.' Rather, § 922(g)(8)'s restric-
tion is limited to when the protective order is in effect.18 9
Though no firearm regulations have failed constitutional muster be-
cause they are irrevocable,'" Option Three's irrevocability is relevant to nar-
row tailoring analysis. The rest of this section addresses how irrevocability
affects PAS's constitutionality. As a preliminary matter, the success of a con-
stitutional challenge to Option Three depends, in part, on the scope of the
'" See supra note 138.
113 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2010).
'8 See id. at 645.
15 See id. at 644-45. The court expressed doubt that § 922(g)(9) imposes a perpetual
prohibition because expungement, pardon, or restoration of civil rights can restore a domestic
violence misdemeanant's Second Amendment rights under the statute. See id.
'"6 But see United States v. Chester, 847 F. Supp. 2d 902, 911 (S.D. W.Va. 2012) (noting
that the fact that § 922(g)(9) "might be seen as a lifetime ban" is of no consequence because
the law is otherwise narrowly tailored to target dangerous individuals).
" United States v. Erwin, No. 07-CR-556, 2008 WL 4534058, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6,
2008).
18 See id. at *2.
'8 See id.
190 Although, plaintiffs have succeeded in as-applied challenges against irrevocable bans.
See, e.g., Binderup v. Holder, No. 13-cv-06750, 2014 WL 4764424, at *21-31 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
25, 2014) (finding for plaintiff who brought as-applied challenge against federal felon-in-pos-
session ban because, despite plaintiff s conviction for corruption of minors, he demonstrated no
proclivity for violence).
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challenge that may be brought. As noted above,1'9 Option Three will have a
constitutional effect on most participants, because most will have waived
their right to purchase a firearm. Furthermore, Option Three will also have a
constitutional effect on participants who pose a long-term high risk of sui-
cide. The government's compelling interest in suicide prevention will clearly
be served by irrevocably preventing these individuals from purchasing a
firearm. Thus, there are two groups of participants Option Three may uncon-
stitutionally reach: first, those who do not effectively waive their Second
Amendment rights and no longer pose a high risk of suicide; second, those
who do not effectively waive their Second Amendment rights and never
posed a high risk of suicide. The next two subsections discuss the constitu-
tional implications of these two categories.
1. Option Three Is Not Overinclusive by Covering Participants Who
No Longer Pose a High Suicide Risk
The first group of participants to whom Option Three may overreach
had a high suicide risk when they signed up for the proposal but do not
maintain a high long-term suicide risk. A lifetime ban is unnecessary to pre-
vent suicide if a substantial number of participants do not maintain a long-
term suicide risk. In contrast, if most high-risk participants face long-term
suicide risk, Option Three's irrevocability is narrowly tailored to prevent sui-
cide among the high-risk population.
The data, though not scientifically conclusive, indicate that high-risk
participants likely remain a long-term risk. It is important to recognize that
the overall suicide rate is small, so relative, not absolute, risk should control.
Most people who have a high suicide risk at any given time do not actually
commit suicide or even go on to make a plan or attempt.'92 Similarly, 21% of
respondents who reported a lifetime history of suicide planning to begin the
study reported instances of planning during the follow-up period, and 15%
of respondents who reported a suicide attempt in their history reported an
attempt during the follow-up.19 Similarly, 21% of respondents who reported
a lifetime history of suicide planning to begin the study reported instances of
planning during the follow-up period, and 15% of respondents who reported
a suicide attempt in their lifetime history reported another attempt during the
follow-up.19 4 In another study conducted in Great Britain, of 11,583 individ-
'9' See supra notes 77-83.
192 See generally Guilherme Borges et al., Risk Factors for the Incidence and Persistence
of Suicide-Related Outcomes, 105 J. AFFECflVE DISORDERs 25 (2008); Keith Hawton et al.,
Suicide Following Deliberate Self-Harm: Long-Term Follow-Up of Patients who Presented to
a General Hospital, 182 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 537 (2003); E.H. H0yer et al., Suicide Risk in
Patients Hospitalized Because of an Affective Disorder: A Follow-Up Study, 1973-1993, 78 J.
AFFECTIVE DISORDERs 209 (2004).
"' Borges et al., supra note 192, at 28. The study defined "ideation" as serious thoughts
about committing suicide. See id. at 26.
94 Id.
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uals who reported a deliberate self-harm incident from 1978 to 1997, 2.6%
had died from suicide by 2000.195 Similarly, in a study from Denmark, 6% of
a sample of patients admitted to psychiatric care for a mood disorder be-
tween 1973 and 1993 eventually died from suicide.196
Although there are low rates of follow-through for high-risk people, the
percentage of completed suicides and recurrent attempts in the high-risk
population is astronomical compared to the general population's rates. For
example, in one study, the overall risk of suicide for self-harm patients in the
year following their self-harm incident was sixty-six times that of the aver-
age population in England and Wales.'97 In the Borges study, 35% of indi-
viduals with a lifetime history of suicidal ideation reported continued
ideation during a ten-year follow-up period,98 while only 3.9% of adults in
the United States report having suicidal thoughts in a typical year.'9 In the
same study, 15% of individuals with a lifetime history of suicide attempt
reported an attempt during the ten-year follow-up period.200 In contrast, from
2004 to 2013, an average of 0.14% of the United States population had a
reported self-harm incident.201 The number of suicide attempts from 2004 to
2013 is likely even lower than 0.14% because only a portion of self-harm
incidents are suicide attempts. Furthermore, given the severity of the risk
associated with suicidal ideation and attempt, 35% and 15% figures still pre-
sent a large risk of death that Option Three would help eliminate.
Additionally, at least for individuals with relatively permanent risk fac-
tors like untreated mood disorders, studies have shown that suicide risk is
consistent over time.202 This group is particularly relevant to PAS, because
individuals with psychiatric diagnoses are most likely to sign up for the pro-
posal. While these participants may be in treatment when they sign up, there
is no guarantee that they will remain in treatment. Thus, there is always a
possibility that these participants' suicidal symptoms can recur. In a study of
310 patients with mood disorders untreated by medication, 38.6% had at
least one suicide attempt in their history.203 The study found no significant
correlation between age and rates of suicide attempts.204 The lack of correla-
" Hawton et al., supra note 192, at 538.
196 H0yer et al., supra note 192, at 212.
197 Hawton et al., supra note 192, at 540.
' Borges et al., supra note 192, at 28.
'
99 See NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONrROi &
PREVENTION, SuIcioE FACTS AT A GLANCE (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf [https://perma.cclXS85-JHCB].
200 Borges et al., supra note 192, at 28.
201 To retrieve this data, see Nonfatal Injury Reports, 2001-2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/nfirates2001.html [https://perma
.cc/5Y74-VMNK], and then select "self-harm" and the year range 2001-2013.
202 See Bemd Ahrens et al., Suicide Attempts, Age and Duration of Illness in Recurrent
Affective Disorders, 36 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 43, 45 (1995).203 Id.
204 Id. at 46.
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tion suggests that the risk of suicide does not decline as patients age.2 05 Fur-
ther, the study found a "highly significant positive correlation" between
rates of psychiatric episodes and rates of suicide attempts in all age groups
(< 40, 40-55, 55).206 This correlation also indicates that the patients' suicide
risk did not change over time.20
While other studies have also found that there is no connection between
suicide risk and age in individuals with mood disorders,2 08 some studies, us-
ing different methodologies, have found a negative correlation between sui-
cide risk and age.23 9 However, such disagreement among the scientific
community is not automatically fatal under strict scrutiny.210 Again, strict
scrutiny requires narrow tailoring, but "[i]t does not demand a perfect
fit." 211
Although Option Three may reach some participants who posed a high
suicide risk when they signed up but do not maintain a long-term suicide
risk, the government can likely overcome a constitutional challenge based on
this overbreadth. First, the assertion that a significant number of high-risk
participants will pose a long-term suicide risk is scientifically supported.
Second, the individuals most likely to sign up for PAS, those with mental
illness, maintain a consistently elevated suicide risk. Finally, most of these
participants will have executed a valid waiver, regardless of their lack of
long-term risk.212 Therefore, Option Three is likely not unconstitutional
based on potential overreach to participants who signed up with a high risk,




208 See id. at 47.
21 See id. (citing M.T. Tsuang & R.T. Woolson, Excess Mortality in Schizophrenia nd
Affective Disorders, 35 ARCHIvEs GN. PSYCHIATRY 1181 (1978)). The long-term suicide rate
amongst the group with mood disorders was still greater than the general population's suicide
rate. Tsuang & Woolson, supra, at 1182 (reporting rates of 10.1% among schizophrenics,
11.1% among manics, and 9.3% among depressives over a long-term follow up period as
compared to 1.9% among the control group).
210 See supra Part IV.A. (discussing the government's ability to rely on a direct and sup-
ported logical conclusion when enacting policy).
211 See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 331 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g
granted, No. 13-1876, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015), argued Oct. 14,
2015.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 77-83.
213 The fact that most high-risk PAS participants experience a lifetime elevated risk of
suicide means that, under Option Two, few will be able to regain their right to purchase a gun
through the judicial hearing. This revelation is not detrimental to Option Two's narrow tailor-
ing, however. Few is not zero; the judicial hearing will ensure that only participants who truly
pose no elevated risk of suicide can regain their rights. Thus, the judicial hearing is narrowly
drawn to promote the government's compelling interest in suicide prevention.
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2. Option Three May Be Overinclusive by Covering Participants
Who Never Posed a High Suicide Risk
The second group of participants to whom Option Three may overreach
did not have a high suicide risk when they signed up for PAS, and did not
execute a valid waiver. The government's compelling interest in suicide pre-
vention is not furthered when this group signs up for PAS. Whereas Option
Two presents an out for these participants through the judicial hearing, Op-
tion Three will burden these participants' Second Amendment rights
perpetually.
This overreach is only justified if it is a "necessary evil" in realizing
Option Three's heightened ability to prevent suicide in comparison to Op-
tions One and Two by themselves. The Supreme Court often frames this
inquiry as the "least restrictive alternative" component of strict scrutiny.214
A challenged restriction is not narrowly tailored if a less-restrictive method
serves the government's interests at least as effectively as the challenged
method.215
There is a good reason to think providing Option Three will save addi-
tional lives. Some people at high suicide risk who sign up for Option Two
may convince a judge that they are not actually at elevated risk, and then
purchase a gun to commit suicide. Option Three eliminates this possibility.
If even one life is saved this way, then Options One and Two alone are not as
effective in achieving PAS's full suicide prevention potential. There is no
less restrictive alternative that is at least equally effective, so Option Three
would survive strict scrutiny.
This rationale and conclusion are consistent with the Heller Court's ex-
press rejection of interest balancing,216 but they may not accurately reflect
the state of the law. One constitutional scholar asserts that "the ... question
becomes whether a particular, incremental reduction in risk justifies a partic-
ular infringement of protected rights in light of other reasonably available,
more or less costly and more or less effective, alternatives."217 Thus, the
analysis weighs the marginal benefits gained by Option Three against the
additional constitutional rights burdened, as compared to Option Two. A cer-
214 See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The Gov-
ernment may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest.").
215 See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (holding that
the burden on protected speech is "unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least
as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve"); Rutan
v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1990) (invalidating a law because a less-
burdensome alternative promoted the government's interests just as effectively as the chal-
lenged law).
216 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) ("We know of no other
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding
'interest-balancing' approach.").
27 Fallon, supra note 108, at 1331.
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tain amount of interest balancing is inherent in strict scrutiny.218 Indeed, one
commentator claims that lower federal courts have "essentially wound up
embracing the sort of interest balancing that Justice Breyer recommended in
his dissenting opinion in Heller.219
Under this approach, Option Three may be more effective at preventing
suicide than Option Two, but the difference may not be enough to justify
Option Three overreaching to participants who never posed a high suicide
risk and did not waive their rights. If Option Two operates as it should, it
will be nearly as effective at preventing suicide as Option Three. Any par-
ticipant who signs up for Option Two and continues to have an elevated
suicide risk for the rest of her life will essentially have signed up for a life-
time ban. The only Option Two participants who will not have a lifetime ban
are those who can prove they no longer pose an elevated suicide risk at the
judicial hearing. Although participants can regain their rights through a judi-
cial hearing under Option Two, but not under Option Three, the effect should
be the same; participants with no elevated suicide risk are not likely to com-
mit suicide, whether they regain the right to purchase a gun under Option
Two or remain restricted under Option Three.
Of course, as suggested above, the judicial hearing will not be perfect.
Even assuming no decision-making errors, under the preponderance of the
evidence standard, some participants who regain their right to purchase a
gun will, in reality, have an elevated suicide risk. Furthermore, some of
these participants may go on to commit suicide after regaining their rights.
However, as articulated above, only a small group will be able to regain their
rights through Option Two's judicial hearing. Even still, a limited number of
the already small group of participants who regain their rights may go on to
commit suicide. Option Three will protect this group against suicide, while
Option Two will not. But Option Three's slight advantage in effectiveness
over Option Two may or may not be deemed substantial enough to justify
Option Three's perpetual overreach to low-risk participants who do not exe-
cute a valid waiver.
The uncertainty of this conclusion reflects uncertainty in the inputs of
the balancing test. Option Three will probably save a small number of addi-
tional lives, but that number is unknown. Option Three will erroneously and
permanently deprive some number of people of their right to purchase a
firearm. That number is also unknown but is also quite likely to be small. As
explained above, most PAS participants will execute a valid waiver of their
rights. Indeed, intelligent design of the sign-up mechanism could ensure that
nearly every participant knows what he or she is doing. But even if more
218 See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things In Proportion? American Rights
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 812 (2011). Mathews and Sweet
assert that strict scrutiny actually started as a balancing test in First Amendment jurisprudence
in the 1950s and 1960s. See id. at 826-27.
219 See Rostron, supra note 63, at 757; cf Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("I would simply adopt such an interest-balancing inquiry explicitly.").
702 [Vol. 53
Bind Me More Tightly Still
people are wrongly deprived than saved, the stakes are asymmetric. Surely,
one life saved is worth a great deal more than one erroneous deprivation of
one avenue to acquire a firearm.220
When all is said and done, though, there is a possibility that Option
Three could fail narrow tailoring.221
V. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
As established in Section II, a court should, and likely would, apply
intermediate scrutiny to a Second Amendment challenge of PAS. This does
not make the strict scrutiny analysis of PAS moot, however. Because inter-
mediate scrutiny is a more lenient standard than strict scrutiny, the schemes
that likely pass strict scrutiny are even more likely to survive intermediate
scrutiny. Additionally, because both standards involve a means-ends type of
analysis, most of the discussion in Section IV will be relevant in this section.
Intermediate scrutiny requires a regulation to be "substantially related
to an important governmental objective."222 Federal courts have applied a
particularly lenient version of intermediate scrutiny to most Second Amend-
ment challenges following Heller and McDonald.2 23 A survey of the Second
Amendment intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence reveals the following differ-
ences between strict and intermediate scrutiny analyses: first, instead of re-
quiring significant empirical support, intermediate scrutiny requires only a
reasonable inference that a law is effective; second, courts give deference to
legislative policy-making; third, courts give deference when legislatures bal-
ance the need for public safety and individuals' interest in self-defense; and
fourth, a regulation does not need to be the least restrictive alternative to be
220 "I'll give you my gun when you take it from my cold, dead hands" is a dramatic
slogan, not necessarily a belief sincerely held by many. See generally Robert Berkvist, Charl-
ton Heston, Epic Film Star and Voice of N.R.A., Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMns (Apr. 6, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/movies/06heston.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/US2V-6CMU].
221 As discussed above in Section II, it may not take a facial challenge to Option Three to
invalidate the entire proposal. For example, a plaintiff who did not execute a valid waiver,
presented a high suicide risk when he signed up for Option Three, and presents a long-term
suicide risk may challenge the proposal. Option Three constitutionally reaches this participant,
because the government's compelling interest in suicide prevention is served by the individ-
ual's participation in Option Three. Nevertheless, because the proposal is subject to means-
ends scrutiny, the court will evaluate Option Three's overall tailoring, not just how Option
Three applies to the plaintiff. Therefore, the overinclusiveness inquiry will reveal Option
Three's flaw-overreach to participants who never posed a high suicide risk. Under strict scru-
tiny, this flaw may be fatal and may invalidate the law.
222 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
223 Rostron, supra note 63, at 752. However, intermediate scrutiny, unlike rationality re-
view, has not been an "automatic pass" in the lower courts post-Heller. Compare Heller v.
District of Columbia (Heller IV), 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (striking down four provisions
of D.C.'s Firearms Registration Amendment Act under intermediate scrutiny), with id. at
281-83 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that she would
uphold each challenged provision and urging the court to give more deference to the
legislature).
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reasonably tailored. The remainder of this section discusses these general
rules and how they impact PAS.
A. The Intermediate Scrutiny Framework
There are four general differences between intermediate scrutiny's sub-
stantial relationship requirement and strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring. First,
under intermediate scrutiny, a challenged law's effectiveness at promoting
the asserted government interest does not need to be substantiated by certain
empirical evidence to pass constitutional muster.22 4 For example, the Ninth
Circuit upheld San Francisco's safe gun storage laws under intermediate
scrutiny.225 The court relied on the city's "reasonable inference" that requir-
ing weapons in the home to be in a locked container would reduce firearm-
related injuries.226 The court also recognized the importance of giving the
city "a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly
serious problems."227
Second, courts applying intermediate scrutiny have consistently given
deference to the legislative policy judgments underlying gun regulations.228
As part of this deference, courts allow legislatures to rely on uncertain, or
even contradictory, empirical evidence to fashion a reasonably tailored
rule.2 9 For example, a court of appeals upheld a ban on hollow-point ammu-
nition.23 0 The court noted that "a municipality may rely on evidence 'reason-
ably believed to be relevant' to substantiate its important interest."2 31 The
legislature's evidence "fairly support[ed]" the finding that hollow-point
bullets are more lethal than regular bullets.2 32 The existence of contradictory
224 See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 966 (9th Cir. 2014);
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 879, 882 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Heller v. District of
Columbia (Heller III), 45 F. Supp. 3d 35, 45 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 801
F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("[T]he Supreme Court has stated explicitly that the government
satisfies intermediate scrutiny if its predictions about the effect of a challenged law are rational
and based on substantial evidence-it need not establish with certitude that the law will actu-
ally achieve its desired end."); cf United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010)
(explaining that intermediate scrutiny requires "the fit between the challenged regulation and
the asserted objective to be reasonable, not perfect").
225 Jackson, 746 F.3d at 966.
226 See id.
227 Id. (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (quoting Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 75 (1976))).
228 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)) ("In the context of firearm regula-
tion, the legislature is 'far better equipped than the judiciary' to make sensitive public policy
judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the
manner to combat those risks."); see also New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo,
804 F.3d 242, 261 (2d Cir. 2015) (reiterating the Second Circuit's deference to legislative
judgment when applying intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges).
229 See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 969.230 Id. at 970.
231 Id. at 969 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52).
232 Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)).
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evidence did not defeat the legislature's "reasonable conclusions" that ban-
ning the ammunition would decrease the injury and death caused by fire-
arms.233 Similarly, another court of appeals reviewing a handgun permit
requirement noted that "reports, statistical information, and other studies"
were unnecessary.234 Instead, the court deferred to the state legislature's
"reasonable inference that given the obviously dangerous and deadly nature
of handguns, requiring a showing of particularized need for a permit to carry
one publicly serves the State's interests in public safety."235
Third, a law is more likely to pass intermediate scrutiny under a Second
Amendment challenge when the legislature considered individuals' interest
in self-defense when fashioning the law.2 36 For example, a federal district
court upheld Colorado's ban on large-capacity magazines.2 37 The court noted
that Colorado's legislature had balanced the government's interest in public
safety with individuals' interest in self-defense because the legislature had
considered a more restrictive limit of twelve rounds, but ultimately adopted
a less restrictive limit of fifteen rounds.238 Similarly, three cases have made
note of state legislatures' balancing of public safety and self-defense con-
cerns in upholding the states' ability to require individuals to justify their
need for a concealed carry permit.239
This point is significant for Options Two and Three. PAS incorporates
both the government's interest in public safety and individuals' interest in
self-defense. The proposal essentially merges the two considerations, be-
cause suicide prevention is part of the government's interest in public
safety,240 and participants will be exercising self-defense by limiting their
access to guns in order to keep themselves safe.
Finally, intermediate scrutiny does not require a law to be the least re-
strictive means of achieving the government's interest.241 Thus, to survive
233 Id.
234 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 437 (3d Cir. 2013).
231 Id. at 438; see also Heller IV, 801 F.3d 264, 279 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that studies
showing gun-safety training reduces firearm-related accidents are unnecessary to justify a
training requirement because "the Supreme Court has 'permitted litigants to jus-
tify . . . restrictions . . . based . . . on history, consensus, and simple common sense' when the
three are conjoined" (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001))).
236 See, e.g., Filko, 724 F.3d at 437.
237 See Colorado Outfitters Ass'n v. Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1074 (D. Colo.
2014).
238 Id. at 1073.
239 See Filko, 724 F.3d at 439 ("New Jersey's schema takes into account the individual's
right to protect himself from violence as well as the community at large's interest in self-
protection."); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 881 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. County
of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2012).
m See Heller III, 45 F. Supp. 3d 35, 49 (D.D.C. 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 801
F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
241 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 261 (2d Cir. 2015)
("Unlike strict scrutiny analysis, we need not ensure that the statute is 'narrowly tailored' or
the 'least restrictive available means to serve the stated governmental interest.'" (quoting
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97)); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir.
2013) (upholding Texas's prohibition on 18-to-20-year-olds carrying handguns in public and
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intermediate scrutiny, a regulation does not need to be the most effective
means available. So long as it is substantially related to the government's
objective, it will pass constitutional muster. .
For example, courts reject the argument that a gun restriction is not
reasonably tailored when the restriction leaves open the possibility of indi-
viduals obtaining guns through some alternative source.2 42 The district court,
in upholding Colorado's ban on large-capacity magazines, reasoned that,
even though people may be able to get large-capacity magazines through
illegal means, it is "reasonable to infer" that Colorado's large-capacity mag-
azine ban will limit the number of available magazines overall and thus re-
duce violent crime.2 43 And a court of appeals in another case upheld the
federal ban on handgun sales to individuals under 21 years old by federally
licensed firearms dealers.244 The court rejected the argument that the prohibi-
tion failed intermediate scrutiny because people under 21 could still
purchase a handgun through a private sale.245 The court asserted that "'a
statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone far-
ther than it did.'"
246
B. Option Two Passes Intermediate Scrutiny
Option Two almost certainly passes intermediate scrutiny, given that
Option Two very likely survives strict scrutiny. The biggest potential uncer-
tainty surrounding Option Two is the assertion that participants will pose a
high risk of self-harm, based on the suggestion that self-assessed suicide risk
is accurate. While Section IV points out that this assertion has not been sci-
entifically proven, the available empirical evidence is certainly enough to
satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Instead of requiring substantial scientific sup-
port, intermediate scrutiny defers to the legislature's reasonable inferences
and policy judgment that voluntary participation will lead to high-risk
participants.
Applying strict scrutiny, Option Two was subject to challenge based on
possible underinclusiveness, given its voluntary nature. This basis for chal-
lenge is unavailable under intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny does
not require a law to be the least restrictive means available to accomplish the
government's objective.2 4 7 Furthermore, the court can defer to the legisla-
ture's judgment that a significant amount of high-risk individuals will sign
denying that Texas should have taken a less restrictive approach by allowing particularly profi-
cient 18-to-20-year-olds to get a license to carry, noting that "Texas need not employ the least
restrictive means to achieve its goal").
242 See Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1073; NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 211 (5th Cir.
2012).
243 Hickenlooper, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1073.
2 "See NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d at 211.
245 See id.
246 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105 (1976)).
247 Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2013).
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up for Option Two. And, again, the underinclusiveness reflects deference to
the Second Amendment rights of non-participants. Therefore, there is little
question that Option Two is constitutional, should a court apply intermediate
scrutiny.
C. Option Three Passes Intermediate Scrutiny
Intermediate scrutiny also cures any residual uncertainties surrounding
the constitutionality of Option Three under strict scrutiny. While overinclu-
siveness based on participants who do not pose a long-term high suicide risk
was likely not detrimental under strict scrutiny, the potential flaw is certainly
not detrimental under intermediate scrutiny. The limited scientific support
for the assertion that a significant amount of high-risk participants will pose
a long-term risk is not an obstacle under intermediate scrutiny, because sub-
stantial empirical support is unnecessary. Instead, a court will defer to the
legislature's reasonable judgment that high-risk individuals will be well
served by an irrevocable waiver.
Furthermore, under strict scrutiny, the fact that a less restrictive but
nearly equally effective alternative to Option Three exists posed a genuine
obstacle. Intermediate scrutiny removes this obstacle because intermediate
scrutiny does not require a law to be the least-restrictive means available to
achieve the government's interest. Option Three's irrevocability is substan-
tially related to suicide prevention by eliminating the possibility that a par-
ticipant will regain his rights through the judicial hearing and then go on to
purchase a gun to commit suicide. Absent the least-restrictive means require-
ment, this effectiveness is enough to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
Allowing individuals to opt for a waiting period to purchase a firearm
(Option One) would save many lives and is constitutional.2 48 But a simple
delay will not deter every gun suicide, as the tragic case of Joseph Braman
illustrates.2 49 This Article proposes two stronger, voluntary restraints against
suicide. Option Two would allow gun purchases only after a judge found the
participant not to be at elevated suicide risk. Under Option Three, the gun
purchase ban would be irrevocable. Providing these options would prevent
more suicides, but present more difficult constitutional questions than would
Option One.
Both options are constitutional, with one potential exception. Option
Two would withstand a Second Amendment challenge; it survives even strict
scrutiny and easily passes the more likely and more appropriate standard of
intermediate scrutiny. Option Three also ought to be subject to intermediate
248 Vars, supra note 12, at 1487-97.
249 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny and ought to pass. However, if a court selected strict scrutiny, Op-
tion Three could fail. The Figure below provides a simplified diagram of the
multiple pathways to constitutionality and the one circuitous route to partial
unconstitutionality.
The policy argument for Option Two is particularly compelling and Op-
tion Two is perfectly consistent with the Second Amendment. This leaves the
legislature considering adoption of PAS with a choice: retain all three op-
tions or drop Option Three. To be sure, a cautious legislature could likely
capture most of the benefits of PAS without Option Three. But a more ag-
gressive legislature might decide to also offer Option Three if it concludes
that the additional lives saved would outweigh the small risk of a finding of
unconstitutionality. With tens of thousands of lives lost each year to gun
suicide, the only bad choice is to do nothing.
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